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Abstract
We study all-pay contests with an exogenous minimal e⁄ort constraint where a player can participate
in a contest only if his e⁄ort (output) is equal to or higher than the minimal e⁄ort constraint. Contestants
are privately informed about a parameter (ability) that a⁄ects their cost of e⁄ort. The designer decides
about the size and the number of prizes. We analyze the optimal prize allocation for the contest designer
who wishes to maximize either the total e⁄ort or the highest e⁄ort. It is shown that if the minimal e⁄ort
constraint is relatively high, the winner-take-all contest in which the contestant with the highest e⁄ort
wins the entire prize sum does not maximize the expected total e⁄ort nor the expected highest e⁄ort. In
that case, the random contest in which the entire prize sum is equally allocated to all the participants
yields a higher expected total e⁄ort as well as a higher expected highest e⁄ort than the winner-take-all
contest.
Keywords: Winner-take-all contests, all-pay auctions, participation constraints.
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11 Introduction
In real-life contests, contestants often face participation constraints. For example, students who compete for
grades in exams are required to achieve a minimal grade, or otherwise fail. Likewise, entry in professional
sport competitions is often restricted, and only contestants who have achieved a certain prede￿ned minimal
requirement are allowed to compete. Researchers at universities too are required to achieve a minimal quality
and quantity of output in order to be promoted. Indeed, initial research in contest design has found that
limiting the number of contestants can be advantageous (see Baye et al., 1993, Taylor, 1995, and Fullerton
& McAfee, 1999). Therefore it is clear that a contest designer who wishes to maximize the contestants￿total
e⁄ort should use endogenous participation constraints such as a reservation price or entry fees in order to
exclude players with low valuations (abilities) from a contest. However, in many contests the participation
constraints are exogenous (for example, the length (time) of R&D races or the minimum funds required for
a candidate to participate in a political contest). In such contests, the contest designer will have limited
control over the design since he cannot change the participation constraints.
In this paper, we assume all-pay contests with exogenous participation constraints and study the optimal
allocation of prizes in these contests.1 In an all-pay contest with a single prize the contestant with the
highest e⁄ort (output) wins the entire prize, but all the contestants bear the cost of their e⁄ort.2 It is well
known that the all-pay contest under incomplete information with the optimal participation constraint is the
optimal mechanism that maximizes the contestants￿expected total e⁄ort (see Myerson (1981)). However, if
the participation constraints are exogenous and are relatively high, neither is the e¢ ciency of the standard
all-pay contest with a single prize nor the optimal allocation of prizes clear. In contests without participation
constraints, the winner-take-all structure in which the contestant with the highest e⁄ort (output) wins the
1There might be other mechanisms which perform better than the all-pay contest in an environment with participation con-
straints, but we assume here that the general form of the contest is exogenous (all-pay) while the prize structure is endogenous.
2A di⁄erent model emphasizes the use of contests to extract e⁄ort under ￿moral hazard￿conditions (see Lazear and Rosen
(1981), Green and Stokey (1983), Nalebu⁄ and Stiglitz (1983), and Rosen (1986)). There output is a stochastic function of the
unobservable e⁄ort, and the identity of the most productive agent is determined by an external shock.
2entire prize sum is usually the optimal architecture that maximizes the contestants￿expected total e⁄ort.
For example, Barut and Kovenock (1998) studied a multi-prize all-pay contest under complete information,
and showed that the revenue maximizing prize structure allows any combination of k ￿ 1 prizes, where k is
the number of contestants. In particular, they showed that allocating the entire prize sum to a unique ￿rst
prize is optimal. Moldovanu and Sela (2001, 2006) studied a one-stage all-pay contest and a two-stage all-pay
contest with multiple prizes under incomplete information. In both cases, they showed that for a contest
designer who maximizes the expected total e⁄ort, if the cost functions are linear in e⁄ort, it is optimal
to allocate the entire prize sum to a single ￿rst prize. Schweinzer and Segev (2009) demonstrated that
the optimal prize structure of symmetric n-player Tullock tournaments assigns the entire prize sum to the
winner, provided that a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium exists. Fu and Lu (2009) studied a multi-stage
sequential elimination Tullock contest, and showed that the optimal contest eliminates one contestant at
each stage until the ￿nal, and the winner of the ￿nal takes the entire prize sum.
In our model of the all-pay contest with a minimal e⁄ort constraint, a contestant can participate only if
his e⁄ort is equal to or higher than the minimal e⁄ort constraint. Contestants are privately informed about
a parameter (ability) that a⁄ects their cost of e⁄ort. The designer decides about the size and number of
prizes. He can allocate prizes such that the contestant with the highest e⁄ort wins a prize which is higher
or equal to the prize of the contestant with the second highest e⁄ort, which is higher or equal to the prize
of the contestant with the third highest e⁄ort, and so on. The designer maximizes either the expected total
e⁄ort or the expected highest e⁄ort. According to our analysis, in contests with a relatively high minimal
e⁄ort constraint, each contestant must have a chance to win the entire prize sum; otherwise the contestants
will not participate in the contest. This result, however, eliminates the option of a contest with a ￿nite
number of prizes in which the entire prize is distributed among several contestants according to their e⁄orts,
and leaves us without many alternatives to the winner-take-all contest. The alternative we consider in this
paper is the random contest in which all the participants, namely, the contestants who exert e⁄orts which
are higher or equal to the minimal e⁄ort constraint, have the same probability to win the entire prize sum.
In the random contest, since the prize is randomly allocated among all the participants, it is obvious that
3contestants do not have an incentive to exert e⁄orts higher than the minimal e⁄ort constraint. Thus, the
participants￿e⁄ort in the winner-take-all contest is clearly higher than in the random contest. On the other
hand, as we show, for any value of the minimal e⁄ort constraint, the number of participants in the random
contest is higher than in the winner-take-all contest. Consequently, it is not clear that the winner-take-all
contest yields a higher expected total e⁄ort than the random contest. Indeed, we demonstrate that if the
minimal e⁄ort constraint is relatively high, the winner-take-all contest, in which the contestant with the
highest e⁄ort wins the entire prize sum, does not maximize the expected total e⁄ort nor the expected highest
e⁄ort. Furthermore, it is shown that, independent of the contestants￿distribution of abilities, for high values
of the minimum e⁄ort constraint, the expected total e⁄ort is higher when the entire prize is equally allocated
to all the participants than when it is allocated to the contestant with the highest e⁄ort only. These results
hold also in the case where the designer wishes to maximize the expected highest e⁄ort. In other words,
even if the designer maximizes the expected highest e⁄ort, he will prefer equal allocation of the entire prize
among all the participants in the contest over an allocation of the entire prize sum to the contestant with
the highest e⁄ort.
We also study the case where there are prize caps such that the value of a prize is smaller than the entire
prize sum. Therefore, at least two contestants win prizes given that there are more than one participant.
It is shown that even with prize caps, independent of the contestants￿distribution of abilities, the expected
total e⁄ort in the random contest is higher than in the winner-take-all contest for high levels of the minimal
e⁄ort constraint. Therefore in contests with prize caps and a minimal e⁄ort constraint the random contest
is still a legitimate contest form.
In the literature on contest theory several researchers have studied the e⁄ect of bid caps in all-pay
auctions. Che and Gale (1998) calculated the bidding equilibrium of a complete information all-pay auction
with two bidders having di⁄erent valuations for a prize and linear cost functions, and demonstrated that a
bid cap can increase the players￿total bid. Gavious, Moldovanu and Sela (2003) studied symmetric all-pay
auctions under incomplete information and showed that, regardless of the number of bidders, if agents have
linear or concave cost functions then setting a bid cap is not pro￿table for a designer who wishes to maximize
4the average bid. They also showed that if agents have convex cost functions, then e⁄ectively capping the
bids is pro￿table for a designer facing a su¢ ciently large number of bidders.3 In the all-pay auction with a
bid cap, similarly to our random contest with a minimal e⁄ort constraint, the prize is randomly allocated
among the contestants who exert an e⁄ort equal to the e⁄ort (bid) cap. However, the e⁄ect of the minimal
e⁄ort constraint on the contestants￿e⁄ort is completely di⁄erent than the e⁄ect of the e⁄ort cap especially
when their levels are high. While for a contest designer who wishes to maximize the expected total e⁄ort
random allocation of the prize sum by using a high bid cap is not e⁄ective, we show that if the minimal
e⁄ort constraint is su¢ ciently high, the prize sum should be randomly allocated among the contestants who
exert an e⁄ort equal to the minimal e⁄ort constraint.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present the model. In Section 3 we analyze
the symmetric equilibrium e⁄ort functions and the expected total e⁄ort in the winner-take-all contest in
which the contestant with the highest e⁄ort wins the entire prize. In Section 4 we analyze the expected total
e⁄ort in the random contest in which the entire prize sum is equally allocated among all the participants. In
Section 5 we compare the total e⁄ort in both forms of the contest, and in Section 6 we compare the expected
highest e⁄ort between these two contests. Section 7 analyzes the equilibrium and the total e⁄ort in both
contest forms when there are prize caps and Section 8 concludes.
2 The model
Consider an all-pay contest with n ￿ 2 contestants. Each contestant i makes an e⁄ort xi: These e⁄orts are
submitted simultaneously. An e⁄ort xi causes a cost xi
ci where ci ￿ 0 is the ability (or type) of contestant
i which is private information to i. Abilities are drawn independently of each other from an interval [0;1]
according to a distribution function F which is common knowledge. We assume that F has a continuous
density dF > 0: There also exists an exogenous minimal e⁄ort 1 ￿ d ￿ 0 such that a contestant can
participate in the contest only if his e⁄ort is higher or equal to d:
3See also Kaplan, Luski and Wettstein (2003) about contests with bid caps.
5The designer decides about the size and number of prizes for which he has a ￿xed total prize sum equal
to 1. He can allocate prizes such that the contestant with the highest e⁄ort wins a prize which is higher or
equal to the prize of the contestant with the second highest e⁄ort which is higher or equal to the prize of
the contestant with the third highest e⁄ort, and so on. We assume that the designer maximizes either the
expected value of total e⁄ort of the contestants or the expected value of their highest e⁄ort. Each contestant
i chooses his e⁄ort in order to maximize his expected utility given the other competitors￿actions and the
values of the prizes.
3 The winner-take-all contest
Assume ￿rst a winner-take-all contest in which the designer allocates the entire prize sum to the contestant
with the highest e⁄ort given that his e⁄ort is higher or equal to the minimal e⁄ort constraint d: We focus on
a symmetric equilibrium where all participants use the same, strictly monotonic equilibrium e⁄ort function
b(c). Applying the revelation principle, player i with ability c chooses to behave as an agent with ability s






In equilibrium, the above maximization problem must be solved by s = c: Then, the calculation of the
equilibrium e⁄ort yields




where k is a constant. Given that there is a minimal e⁄ort constraint d; there exists a cuto⁄ e c such that all
the contestants with lower types (abilities) than e c decide to stay out of the contest and all the contestants
with higher types than e c (participants) decide to participate in the contest. The e⁄ort of the contestant with
type e c (cuto⁄) is equal to d and his expected payo⁄ is equal to zero. Thus, we have
e cF(e c)n￿1 ￿ b(e c) = e cF(e c)n￿1 ￿ d = 0 (1)
6By (1) we obtain that k =
R e c
0 F(y)n￿1dy, so the equilibrium e⁄ort for every c ￿ e c is given by















From equation (1) it can be veri￿ed that e c ￿ d and e c = d only when both of these parameters are equal to
1. Thus by (3) we can see that TEW(d = 0) > 0 and TEW(d = 1) = 0. The relation between the expected
total e⁄ort TEW and the value of the minimal e⁄ort constraint d is as follows:
Proposition 1 In the winner-take-all contest, the expected total e⁄ort increases in (su¢ ciently) small values
of the minimal e⁄ort constraint, and decreases in (su¢ ciently) large values of the minimal e⁄ort constraint.
Proof. See Appendix.
By Proposition 1 we can see that if the minimal e⁄ort constraint d is relatively high, the contest designer
does not have any incentive to manipulate the level of the participation constraint. The reason is that he
cannot impose a minimal e⁄ort constraint smaller than d, and if he imposes an endogenous minimal e⁄ort
constraint larger than d, the utility of the contest designer who maximizes the total e⁄ort will be reduced.
Suppose now that the contest designer allocates the entire-prize sum to the two contestants with the
highest e⁄orts given that their e⁄orts are higher or equal to d. In this case, the prize for the contestant
with the highest e⁄ort is a ￿ 0:5; and the prize for the contestant with the second highest e⁄ort is 1 ￿ a:
Then, it can be veri￿ed that the expected highest e⁄ort is smaller or equal to a < 1. If the value of the
minimal e⁄ort is larger than the value of the ￿rst prize, d > a; the contest is not e¢ cient since no contestant
will participate in it. Hence, if the minimal e⁄ort constraint d is relatively high, an allocation of a ￿nite
number of prizes is not a relevant option for a designer who wishes to maximize the total e⁄ort. As such, we
can conclude that in contests with a relatively high minimal e⁄ort constraint, each contestant must have a
chance to win the entire prize sum or else the contestants will not participate in the contest. Obviously this
7argument leaves us with few alternatives to the winner-take-all contest where the minimal e⁄ort constraint
has relatively high values. In the next section we discuss the alternative we ￿nd the most plausible.
4 The random contest
Consider the random contest in which the contest designer equally allocates the entire prize sum to all the
contestants who exert e⁄orts higher or equal to the minimal e⁄ort constraint d; that is, all the participants
in the contest have the same probability to win the entire prize sum. Denote by b c the cuto⁄, such that all
the contestants with lower types (abilities) than b c decide to stay out of the contest, and all the contestants
with higher types than b c decide to participate in the contest. Since the allocation of the prize sum does not
depend on the e⁄ort level, given that it is higher or equal to the minimal e⁄ort constraint d; the participants
do not have any incentive to exert e⁄orts higher than the minimal e⁄ort constraint d. The probability of
winning with an e⁄ort of d is
























































AF(b c)n￿j(1 ￿ F(b c))j￿1
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AF(b c)n￿j(1 ￿ F(b c))j
=
1 ￿ F(b c)n
n(1 ￿ F(b c))
:
Thus, the expected payo⁄ of contestant i with ability of c that submits an e⁄ort of d is
1 ￿ F(b c)n




8The expected total e⁄ort is
TER = dn(1 ￿ F(b c)) (4)
where the cuto⁄ b c satis￿es
1 ￿ F(b c)n






n(1 ￿ F(b c))











By (5) we obtain that b c ￿ d and b c = d only when both of these parameters are equal to 1. We can see
that TER(d = 0) = TER(d = 1) = 0 and, similarly to the winner-take-all contest, we obtain that
Proposition 2 In the random contest the total e⁄ort increases in (su¢ ciently) small values of the minimal
e⁄ort constraint, and decreases in (su¢ ciently) large values of the minimal e⁄ort constraint.
Proof. See Appendix.
Thus, by Proposition 2, like in the winner-take-all contest, the contest designer in the random contest
does not have any incentive to manipulate the level of the minimal e⁄ort constraint, given that it is relatively
high.
Proposition 3 For any value of the minimal e⁄ort constraint, the number of participants in the random
contest is equal to or larger than in the winner-take-all contest.
Proof. See Appendix.
By Proposition 3, the number of participants in the random contest is larger than in the winner-take-all
contest. On the other hand, the participants￿e⁄orts in the winner-take-all contest are higher than in the
random contest. In the next section we deal with the problem of which contest form, the random contest or
the winner-take-all contest, yields the higher total e⁄ort.
95 Total e⁄ort
In this section we assume that the contest designer wishes to maximize the expected total e⁄ort. Without a
minimal e⁄ort constraint (d = 0), Moldovanu and Sela (2001) have shown that the winner-take-all contest
is the optimal design that maximizes the contestants￿expected total e⁄ort, given that their cost functions
are linear. Below we show that Moldovanu-Sela￿ s result does not necessarily hold in contests with minimal
e⁄ort constraints.
Denote by dR￿opt the optimal minimal e⁄ort constraint that maximizes the contestants￿expected total
e⁄ort in the random contest. The winner-take-all contest obviously yields a higher expected total e⁄ort
than the random contest for d = 0 and also for su¢ ciently small values of the minimal e⁄ort constraint.
The following result gives the highest values of minimal e⁄ort constraint, d = dR￿opt, for which the random
contest most certainly will not be e¢ cient for a contest designer who maximizes the total e⁄ort.
Proposition 4 For any value of the minimal e⁄ort constraint which is smaller than or equal to the optimal
minimal e⁄ort constraint in the random contest, d ￿ dR￿opt, a mixed structure of the winner-take-all contest
and the random contest yields a higher total e⁄ort than the random contest.4
Proof. See Appendix.
So far we have shown that the random contest is not a relevant option for a designer who maximizes
the total e⁄ort if the minimal e⁄ort constraint has relatively low values, d ￿ dR￿opt. The following example
shows that for relatively high values of the minimal e⁄ort constraint, d > dR￿opt; the random contest might
be a better option than the winner-take-all contest for a designer who wishes to maximize the expected total
e⁄ort.
Example 1 Suppose that the number of contestants is n = 4 and the contestants￿abilities are distributed
4In a mixed structure of the winner-take-all contest and the random contest, the contest designer allocates the prize sum by
having the contestant with the highest e⁄ort win a prize equal to (1￿a), while a prize equal to a is shared by all the contestants
with e⁄orts higher than or equal to the minimal e⁄ort constraint d:
10according to
F(c) = c
Then, by (1) +(3) and (4)+(5) we obtain the values of the total e⁄ort as a function of the minimal e⁄ort
constraint d in the winner-take-all contest and in the random contest. These values are displayed in the
Table below.










We can see that for all 0:4 ￿ d < 1 the total e⁄ort in the random contest is larger than the total e⁄ort
in the winner-take-all contest.
The following result generalizes the ￿ndings of Example 1.
Theorem 1 For every distribution of the contestants￿abilities F; there exists a number 0 < dt(F) < 1 such
that for every minimal e⁄ort constraint d ￿ dt(F); the expected total e⁄ort in the random contest is higher
than in the winner-take-all.
Proof. See Appendix.
Theorem 1 demonstrates that the random contest is a legitimate option for a designer who maximizes
the expected total e⁄ort if the values of the minimal e⁄ort constraint are relatively high.
116 Highest e⁄ort
The contest designer￿ s goal is not necessarily to maximize the contestants￿expected total e⁄ort. Rather he
















where b(c) is the equilibrium e⁄ort function given by (2) and the cuto⁄ e c is given by (1).
The expected highest e⁄ort in the random contest is
HER = d(1 ￿ F(b c)n) (7)
where the cuto⁄ b c is given by (5).
Note that the highest e⁄ort in the random contest is smaller or equal to d, while in the winner-take-all
contest it is larger or equal to d. However, the probability that all the contestants will choose to stay out of
the winner-take-all contest is higher than in the random contest. Thus, it is not clear that even the expected
highest e⁄ort in the winner-take-all is higher than in the random contest. Indeed, we have
Theorem 2 For every distribution of the contestants￿abilities F; there exists a number 0 < dh(F) < 1,
such that for every minimal e⁄ort constraint d ￿ dh(F); the expected highest e⁄ort in the random contest is
higher than in the winner-take-all.
Proof. See Appendix.
Theorem 2 shows that even if the designer maximizes the expected highest e⁄ort, he will prefer to equally
allocate the entire prize among all the participants in the contest rather than to allocate the entire prize sum
to the contestant with the highest e⁄ort. The intuitive explanation to this result is that when the minimal
e⁄ort constraint d is very high, the expected number of participants is relatively low such that there is no
meaningful di⁄erence between the expected total e⁄ort and the expected highest e⁄ort. However, it could be
12easily veri￿ed that in the case where a designer maximizes the expected highest e⁄ort, the advantage of the
random contest over the winner-take-all contest is valid for a smaller range of the minimal e⁄ort constraint
values than in the case where a designer maximizes the expected total e⁄ort.
7 Prize caps
Suppose now that the designer has a ￿xed total prize sum equal to 2; and assume also that there exists a
prize cap such that the maximal value of a single prize is 1: In such a case, it can be shown that for the
designer who wishes to maximize the total e⁄ort in the winner-take-all contest it is optimal to allocate two
prizes, each equal to the prize cap 1, for the contestants with the two highest e⁄orts given that their e⁄orts
are higher than or equal to the minimal e⁄ort constraint d: In the random contest, if only one contestant
decides to participate with an e⁄ort equal to d, he wins a prize equal to 1; and in any other case with k ￿ 2
participants, each participant has the same probability to win a prize equal to 1.
In the winner-take-all contest with two identical prizes, each of them equal to 1, contestant i with ability
c chooses to behave as an agent with ability s to solve the following optimization problem:
max
s F(s)n￿1 + (n ￿ 1)F(s)n￿2(1 ￿ F(s)) ￿
￿ (s)
c
where ￿(c) is the symmetric equilibrium e⁄ort function given by
￿(c) = cF(c)n￿1 + c(n ￿ 1)F(c)n￿2(1 ￿ F(c)) ￿
Z c
￿ ! c
(F(y)n￿1 + (n ￿ 1)F(y)n￿2(1 ￿ F(y)))dy
where the cuto⁄ ￿ ! c is given by
￿ ! c F( ￿ ! c )n￿1 + ￿ ! c (n ￿ 1)F(￿ ! c )n￿2(1 ￿ F(￿ ! c )) = d (8)








(cF(c)n￿1 + c(n ￿ 1)F(c)n￿2(1 ￿ F(c)) ￿
Z c
￿ ! c
(F(y)n￿1 + (n ￿ 1)F(y)n￿2(1 ￿ F(y)))dy)F0(c)dc
13In the random contest, the probability of winning one of the two prizes with an e⁄ort of d is




























































AF(  ￿ c )n￿j(1 ￿ F(  ￿ c ))j￿1 ￿ F(  ￿ c )n￿1
=
2










AF(  ￿ c )n￿j(1 ￿ F(  ￿ c ))j ￿ F(  ￿ c )n￿1
=
2(1 ￿ F(  ￿ c )n)
n(1 ￿ F(  ￿ c ))
￿ F(  ￿ c )n￿1
The expected total e⁄ort is
TERC = dn(1 ￿ F(  ￿ c )) (10)
where the cuto⁄   ￿ c satis￿es
2(1 ￿ F(  ￿ c )n)
n(1 ￿ F(  ￿ c ))
￿ F(  ￿ c )n￿1 ￿
d
  ￿ c
=
2(1 + F(  ￿ c ) + ::: + F(  ￿ c )n￿1)
n
￿ F(  ￿ c )n￿1 ￿
d
  ￿ c
= 0 (11)
Theorem 3 For every distribution of the contestants￿abilities F; there exists a number 0 < dc(F) < 1 such
that for every minimal e⁄ort constraint d ￿ dc(F); the expected total e⁄ort in the random contest with a
prize cap is higher than in the winner-take-all contest with a prize cap.
Proof. See Appendix.
Theorem 3 demonstrates that if the levels of the prizes are limited, the random contest is still a legitimate
option for a designer who maximizes the expected total e⁄ort if the values of the minimal e⁄ort constraint
are relatively high.
148 Concluding remarks
We studied all-pay contests with a minimal e⁄ort constraint and the following two forms of prize allocation:
1. A winner-take-all contest where the contestant with the highest e⁄ort (output) wins the entire prize sum.
2. A random contest where all the participants have the same probability to win the entire prize sum. We
showed that independent of the distribution of the contestants￿abilities, if the minimal e⁄ort constraint is
relatively high, the random contest yields a higher expected total e⁄ort than the winner-take-all contest.
Our results were shown to hold for high values of the minimal e⁄ort constraint, but we also demonstrated
by an example that the results hold even for minimal e⁄ort constraint values that are not relatively high.
The main implication of this paper is that the existence of participation constraints in contests is a possible
explanation for why multiple-prize contests exist in the real world. Another implication of our results relates
to the system of grading in many universities worldwide given that a designer (lecturer) has a constraint on
the average of the students￿grades in each class. In various universities, grades fall in the range of 0-100.
In Israel, for example, BA students whose grades are smaller than 56 and MA students whose grades are
smaller than 65 fail. In that case, the minimal e⁄ort constraints fall in the range in which the random contest
might yield a higher expected total e⁄ort as well as a higher expected highest e⁄ort than the winner-take-all
contest. Indeed, contests among students at universities are composed of a mixture of the random contest
and the winner-take-all contest. However, according to our results, if the minimal output (grade) constraint
is su¢ ciently high, the random contest is a better option than the winner-take-all contest and then binary
grades of fail/pass should be applied.
159 Appendix
9.1 Proof of Proposition 1






F(e c)n￿1F0(c)dc ￿ ne cF(e c)n￿1F0(e c)
= nF(e c)n￿1(1 ￿ F(e c) ￿ e cF0(e c))















nF(e c)n￿1(1 ￿ F(e c) ￿ e cF0(e c))
F(e c)n￿1 + (n ￿ 1)e cF(e c)n￿2F0(e c)
(12)
Since the cuto⁄ e c approaches zero when d approaches zero, and 1￿F(e c)￿e cF0(e c) > 0 when e c approaches
zero, we obtain that dTEW
dd > 0 for su¢ ciently small values of d: Since the cuto⁄ e c approaches 1 when d







1 + (n ￿ 1)F0(1)
< 0 (13)
Q:E:D:
9.2 Proof of Proposition 2






n(1 + F(b c) + ::: + F(b c)n￿1) + b c
n(F0(b c) + ::: + (n ￿ 1)F(b c)n￿2F0(b c))
(14)












= n(1 ￿ F(b c)) +
￿dnF0(b c)
1
n(1 + F(b c) + ::: + F(b c)n￿1) + b c
n(F0(b c) + ::: + (n ￿ 1)F(b c)n￿2F0(b c))





= n > 0











9.3 Proof of Proposition 3
By (1) the cuto⁄ in the winner-take-all contest satis￿es
e cF(e c)n￿1 = d
By (5) the cuto⁄ in the random contest satis￿es
b c(1 ￿ F(b c)n)
n(1 ￿ F(b c))
= d
Let w(c) = cF(c)n￿1 and r(c) =
c(1￿F(c)
n)
n(1￿F(c)) : Note that w(c) and r(c) are increasing functions that satisfy













9.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose that the contest designer allocates the prize sum by having the contestant with the highest e⁄ort
win a prize equal to (1 ￿ a), while a prize equal to a is shared by all the contestants with e⁄orts which are
higher or equal to the minimal e⁄ort constraint d. The symmetric equilibrium in this case is given by
17￿(c) = (1 ￿ a)cF(c)n￿1 ￿
Z c
c
(1 ￿ a)F(y)n￿1dy + s
where c is the cuto⁄ and s is a constant. Since the expected payo⁄ of type c is zero and his e⁄ort is equal












((1 ￿ a)cF(c)n￿1 ￿
Z c
c







((1 ￿ a)cF(c)n￿1 ￿
Z c
c












































F(y)n￿1dy)F0(c)dc + nd(1 ￿ F(c)) +
dc
da
(1 ￿ F(c)n ￿ cnF(c)n￿1F0(c))
< ￿nd(1 ￿ F(c)) + nd(1 ￿ F(c)) +
dc
da




(1 ￿ F(c)n ￿ cnF(c)n￿1F0(c))
It can be shown that dc
da ￿ 0; that is, the higher the prize shared by all the participants is, the higher is the











= n(1 ￿ F(b c)) ￿ dnF0(b c)
n(1 ￿ F(b c))
1 ￿ F(b c)n ￿ b cnF(b c)n￿1F0(b c) + dnF0(b c)
=
n(1 ￿ F(b c))(1 ￿ F(b c)n ￿ b cnF(b c)n￿1F0(b c))
1 ￿ F(b c)n ￿ b cnF(b c)n￿1F0(b c) + dnF0(b c)
18Thus, the cuto⁄ b cm that maximizes the expected total e⁄ort in the random contest satis￿es 1 ￿ F(b cm)n ￿
b cmnF(b cm)n￿1F0(b cm) = 0 and for every b c ￿ b cm there exists 1 ￿ F(b c)n ￿ b cnF(b c)n￿1F0(b c) > 0. That is, we
obtain that for every d ￿ dR￿opt
lim
a!1
(1 ￿ F(c)n ￿ cnF(c)n￿1F0(c)) = 1 ￿ F(b c)n ￿ b cnF(b c)n￿1F0(b c) > 0
Hence, lima!1
dTE
da < 0, that is, decreasing the total prize allocated to all the participants or, alternatively,
increasing the prize for the contestant with the highest e⁄ort, necessarily increases the contestants￿expected
total e⁄ort.
Q:E:D:
9.5 Proof of Theorem 1
By (3) and (4) we have
￿T(d = 1) = TER(d = 1) ￿ TEW(d = 1) = 0


















1 + (n ￿ 1)F0(1)
< 0
Thus, there exists 0 < dt < 1 such that for all d ￿ dt, ￿T(d) = TER(d) ￿ TEW(d) ￿ 0. Q:E:D:
9.6 Proof of Theorem 2
By (6) and (7) we have
￿H(d = 1) = HER(d = 1) ￿ HEW(d = 1) = 0












= 1 ￿ F(b c)n ￿
dnF(b c)n￿1F0(b c)
1
n(1 + F(b c) + ::: + F(b c)n￿1) + b c










F(e c)n￿1(1 ￿ F(e c)n ￿ ne cF(e c)n￿1F0(e c))
F(e c)n￿1 + (n ￿ 1)e cF(e c)n￿2F0(e c)



















1 + (n ￿ 1)F0(1)
< 0
Thus, there exists 0 < dh < 1 such that for all d ￿ dh, ￿H(d) = HER(d) ￿ HEW(d) ￿ 0. Q:E:D:
9.7 Proof of Theorem 3
Consider ￿rst the random contest. By (11) and the implicit functions theorem we have




h(  ￿ c )
(18)
where
h(  ￿ c ) =
2
n
(1 + F(  ￿ c ) + ::: + F(  ￿ c )n￿1) +
2  ￿ c
n
(F0(  ￿ c ) + ::: + (n ￿ 1)F(  ￿ c )n￿2F0(  ￿ c ))
￿Fn￿1(  ￿ c ) ￿   ￿ c (n ￿ 1)F(  ￿ c )n￿2F0(  ￿ c )
By (10) and (18) we have,







d  ￿ c
d  ￿ c
dd
= n(1 ￿ F(  ￿ c )) ￿ dnF0(  ￿ c )
1
h(  ￿ c )
Since   ￿ c approaches 1 when d approaches 1, we have
lim
d!1




2 + (n ￿ 1)F0(1) ￿ 1 ￿ (n ￿ 1)F0(1)
= ￿nF0(1) < 0 (19)
Consider now the winner-take-all contest. By (9) we have





(F(￿ ! c )n￿1 + (n ￿ 1)F(￿ ! c )n￿2(1 ￿ F(￿ ! c )))F0(c)dc
￿n￿ ! c F0(￿ ! c )(F(￿ ! c )n￿1 + (n ￿ 1)F(￿ ! c )n￿2(1 ￿ F(￿ ! c )))
= (nF(￿ ! c )n￿1 + n(n ￿ 1)F(￿ ! c )n￿2(1 ￿ F(￿ ! c )))(1 ￿ F(￿ ! c ) ￿ ￿ ! c F0(￿ ! c ))





g(￿ ! c )
where
g(￿ ! c ) = F(￿ ! c )n￿1 + (n ￿ 1)￿ ! c F(￿ ! c )n￿2F0(￿ ! c ) + (n ￿ 1)F(￿ ! c )n￿2(1 ￿ F(￿ ! c ))
+(n ￿ 1)(n ￿ 2)￿ ! c F(￿ ! c )n￿3(1 ￿ F(￿ ! c ))F0(￿ ! c ) ￿ (n ￿ 1)￿ ! c F(￿ ! c )n￿2F0(￿ ! c )
Thus,








(nF(￿ ! c )n￿1 + n(n ￿ 1)F(￿ ! c )n￿2(1 ￿ F(￿ ! c )))(1 ￿ F(￿ ! c ) ￿ ￿ ! c F0(￿ ! c ))
g(￿ ! c )
Since the cuto⁄ ￿ ! c approaches 1 when d approaches 1, we have
lim
d!1
dTEWC(d;￿ ! c )
dd
= ￿nF0(1) < 0 (20)
By (20) and (19) we obtain
lim
d!1
dTERC(d;  ￿ c )
dd
￿
dTEWC(d;￿ ! c )
dd







d2TERC(d;  ￿ c )
dd2 ￿ lim
d!1
d2TEWC(d;￿ ! c )
dd2
= ￿2nF0(1) ￿ nF00(1) ￿ n(n ￿ 1)(n ￿ 2)(F0(1))3 + 2(2 + 6 + ::: + (n ￿ 1)(n ￿ 2))(F0(1))3
￿(￿2nF0(1) ￿ nF00(1) ￿ n(n ￿ 1)(n ￿ 2)(F0(1))3)




dd2 ￿ 0: We obtained that the point d = 1 is a minimum point of TERC(d;  ￿ c )￿TEWC(d;￿ ! c )
which implies that there exists 0 < dc < 1 such that for all d ￿ dc, TERC(d;  ￿ c )￿TEWC(d;￿ ! c ) ￿ 0. Q:E:D
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